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Abstract—Small cells deployed in licensed spectrum and un-
licensed access via WiFi provide different ways of expanding
wireless services to low mobility users. That reduces the demand
for conventional macro-cellular networks, which are better suited
for wide-area mobile coverage. The mix of these technologies seen
in practice depends in part on the decisions made by wireless
service providers that seek to maximize revenue, and allocations
of licensed and unlicensed spectrum by regulators. To understand
these interactions we present a model in which a service provider
allocates available licensed spectrum across two separate bands,
one for macro- and one for small-cells, in order to serve two
types of users: mobile and fixed. We assume a service model
in which the providers can charge a (different) price per unit
rate for each type of service (macro- or small-cell); unlicensed
access is free. With this setup we study how the addition of
unlicensed spectrum affects prices and the optimal allocation of
bandwidth across macro-/small-cells. We also characterize the
optimal fraction of unlicensed spectrum when new bandwidth
becomes available.
I. INTRODUCTION
Current cellular networks are evolving towards heteroge-
neous networks (HetNets) to cope with the accelerating de-
mand for wireless data along with variations in mobility and
service requirements [1], [2]. The primary feature of a HetNet
is the deployment of multiple types of access infrastructure
with different transmission powers, range, and spectral effi-
ciency, such as small-cells targeting local “hot spots.” In addi-
tion to cellular infrastructure in licensed spectrum allocations,
unlicensed services (e.g., WiFi) are an increasingly common
alternative for providing users local access. As unlicensed
networks and HetNets proliferate, wireless users have greater
choice in the type of network they can access. That can in
turn affect strategic decisions on the part of the SPs regarding
pricing and network resource allocation.
While the introduction of HetNets, and small-cell networks
in particular, will increase overall data capacity, network man-
agement and resource allocation become more complicated. In
particular, an SP must allocate available resources across dif-
ferent cell types (small vs macro) taking into account mobility
patterns and demand for different services. That allocation then
interacts with pricing strategies that can differentiate among
service categories and controls revenue. Resource allocation
is further complicated by the existence of unlicensed WiFi
This work was supported by NSF under grant 1343381.
networks, which can be viewed both as an additional resource
for offloading traffic, and as a source of competition for small-
cell networks in licensed spectrum.1
In this paper we study the effect of unlicensed spectrum on
resource allocation in HetNets containing large- (macro-) and
small- (pico- or femto-) cells. The macro- and small-cells are
assumed to be operated by a cellular SP, or multiple competing
SPs, using licensed (proprietary) spectrum. To model the
demand for different services, we assume two types of users:
mobile and fixed. The mobile users must be served by macro-
cells only, whereas the fixed users can be served by either
the macro- or small-cells, or via the unlicensed spectrum. We
assume that the SPs charge a price per unit rate to access their
network. The macro- and small-cells are viewed as providing
two different services, hence the SPs set two corresponding
prices for access. There is no access fee for the unlicensed
band. In all cases the available rate is split among all users
sharing the band. Given this setup, the SPs wish to set prices
and allocate bandwidth across the macro- and small-cells to
maximize their revenue.
Our model is similar to that presented in our previous
work [14] to study bandwidth allocation in HetNets with
competing SPs; however, here the main distinguishing feature
is the presence of the unlicensed band. Our results show
how the unlicensed spectrum affects the SPs’ willingness to
allocate resources to the small-cell network. Moreover, the
model and results can be used to quantify the utility (total
welfare) offered by the unlicensed spectrum, and to compare
it with that generated by the licensed spectrum taking the
strategic decisions of the SPs into account. The introduction
of unlicensed spectrum raises several analytical challenges vis-
a-vis prior work (e.g., [14]). This is due to the expanded
set of choices (i.e., for fixed-user association) and also the
additional conditions on equilibria due to competition from
the unlicensed service.
We now summarize our main results. We first focus on a
monopoly SP, and then consider the more complicated scenario
with multiple competing SPs. In all scenarios we model the
SP and user actions as a two-stage game in which the SPs first
partition the licensed band into subbands for the macro- and
1For example, AT&T’s WiFi network helps to expand the capacity of
AT&T’s cellular network, whereas Comcast’s WiFi service effectively com-
petes with cellular services.
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small-cell networks, and subsequently announce prices for ser-
vices. The prices then enable the fixed users to determine their
network association (macro-/small-/unlicensed). The following
results are obtained by analyzing sub-game perfect equilibria,
assuming a class of α-fair utility functions for tractability.
1. HetNet Market structure: In equilibrium the macro-cell
network serves only mobile users. Fixed users then associate
with either the small-cell or unlicensed network. This applies
when the SPs maximize either revenue or social welfare.
Hence this association is optimal in the sense of maximizing
social welfare.2
2. Bandwidth allocation with monopoly SP: Comparing
bandwidth allocations with and without unlicensed spectrum,
when maximizing revenue, a monopoly SP may allocate more
bandwidth to small-cells with unlicensed than without. This
occurs when the unlicensed network offers a sufficiently low
rate (e.g., due to a small amount of unlicensed bandwidth).
This seems counterintuitive when the unlicensed network is
viewed as an additional resource; however, this is because the
presence of unlicensed bandwidth alters the dependence of
quantity (users served) with price. In contrast, when the SP
maximizes social welfare, it always allocates less bandwidth
to small cells with unlicensed spectrum.
3. Equilibrium with competitive SPs: With multiple com-
petitive SPs we prove that there always exists a unique
sub-game perfect equilibrium with an associated bandwidth
allocation. Furthermore, the equilibrium can fall in one of
three categories: (1) all SPs allocate bandwidth to both macro-
and small-cells (“Macro-Small Nash Equilibrium”, or MSNE);
(2) a subset of SPs allocate bandwidth to macro-cells only,
and the rest allocate to both macro and small cells (“Macro-
Preferred Nash Equilibrium”, or MPNE); and (3) all SPs
allocate bandwidth only to macro-cells (“Macro-only Nash
Equilibrium”, or MNE). Without unlicensed spectrum for our
choice of utility functions only the MSNE is possible [14].
Hence the increased competition from the unlicensed network
may cause some SPs to give up on small-cells and allocate
bandwidth only to the macro-cells. We also consider the
asymptotic scenario where the number of SPs goes to infinity
and observe that in general, the equilibrium with an arbitrary
amount of unlicensed spectrum does not achieve the maximum
social welfare.
4. Dependence of social welfare on the licensed/unlicensed
split: For spectrum regulators, such as the FCC, a challenge
is determining how much newly available spectrum should be
licensed or unlicensed. We use our results to illustrate how the
mix of licensed and unlicensed spectrum affects social welfare.
This depends crucially on the relative spectral efficiencies
associated with the small-cell and unlicensed networks. If
the small-cell network has higher spectral efficiency, then
allocating the entire bandwidth as licensed maximizes social
welfare. Conversely, if the unlicensed network has higher
spectral efficiency, then there is an optimal (positive) amount
of unlicensed spectrum, which may or may not achieve the
2This result was also shown to hold without unlicensed spectrum in [14].
maximum social welfare. Furthermore, allocating insufficient
unlicensed bandwidth in this scenario can cause the social
welfare to decrease below the all-licensed allocation. (This is
illustrated in Fig. 5 in Sec. VII.)
Related work on pricing and bandwidth allocation in het-
erogeneous wireless networks is presented in [3]–[9]. In [3]–
[5] small-cell service is an enhancement to macro-cell service,
and in [6]–[9] small- and macro-cells provide separate services
(as we assume here). Optimal pricing only is studied in [3],
[5], whereas joint pricing and bandwidth allocation is studied
in [4], [6]–[9]. However, in that work there is a single SP
(monopoly) and no unlicensed spectrum.
In [10]–[14], competition among multiple SPs providing
HetNet services is investigated. References [10], [11] study
pricing and service competition with fixed bandwidth allo-
cations, while [12]–[14] study both pricing and bandwidth
optimization. However, in [12], [13] the SPs compete to
acquire the spectrum from a spectrum broker, as opposed
to optimizing the bandwidth allocation across the different
cell types in [14]. The preceding work does not consider any
interactions with unlicensed access.
While the preceding work focuses on HetNet deployments
using licensed spectrum, the interaction of unlicensed with
licensed spectrum in other contexts is considered in [15]–
[17]. In [15] an economic analysis of the trade-off between
incremental licensed and unlicensed spectrum allocations is
presented, which shows that licensed spectrum is the favored
option. In [16], an intermediate model of price competition
between two SPs having a fixed licensed part of the spectrum
and sharing the remaining part as unlicensed is proposed.
It is shown that user welfare increases with the proportion
of unlicensed spectrum; however, the overall social welfare
decreases, indicating resources are used less efficiently. Ref-
erence [17] studies social welfare when unlicensed spectrum
is added to an existing allocation of licensed spectrum among
incumbent competing SPs. The conclusion is that the social
welfare can decrease over a significant range of unlicensed
bandwidths. The preceding work assumes that the licensed
spectrum supports a single type of service, hence does not
consider the associated bandwidth allocation problem studied
here. Also, except for [17], the users are assumed to be
homogeneous.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce our system
model in Section II. The price and user association equilibrium
for a monopoly SP is presented in Section III. Optimal
bandwidth allocation for revenue maximization is discussed
in Section IV, and for social welfare maximization in Section
V. We then consider multiple competing SPs in Section VI.
The dependence of social welfare on the amount of unlicensed
bandwidth is discussed in VII, and conclusions are presented
in Section VIII. All proofs of the main results and several
supplemental results can be be found in the appendices.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network Model
We consider a scenario where there are one or more SPs,
each of which has a two-tier cellular network operating in
licensed spectrum consisting of macro-cells (with wide cov-
erage) and small-cells (with only local coverage). Macro-cells
and small-cells are assumed to operate in separate bands.3 We
also assume that there is unlicensed spectrum in which WiFi
Access Points (APs) are deployed with no access charges. The
assumption of no access charge is made to make the unlicensed
as desirable as possible to the users. Users in the network are
classified into two categories based on their mobility: mobile
users that can only be served by macro-cells and fixed users
that can be served by macro-cells, small-cells or WiFi (but not
multiple at the same time).
Macro-cells, small-cells and WiFi APs are assumed to
be uniformly deployed over a given area.4 To simplify our
analysis we restrict our attention to the case where all SPs
have the same infrastructure deployment density. The density
of macro-cells per SP is normalized to one and we denote
the densities of small-cells and WiFi APs by NS and NU ,
respectively. Both types of users are also uniformly deployed
over the given area, and we assume a large number of users so
that we can model them as non-atomic. The density of fixed
and mobile users are given by Nf and Nm, respectively.
We assume that each SP i has total bandwidth Bi and
the macro-cells of SP i can provide a total data rate of
Ci,M = Bi,MR0, where R0 is the (average) spectral efficiency
and Bi,M is the bandwidth allocated to macro-cells by SP
i.5 Similarly, the total available rate in small-cells of SP
i and in WiFi APs are defined as Ci,S = λSBi,SR0 and
CU = λUBUR0, respectively. Here λS and λU reflect the rate
difference due to the combination of spectral efficiency and
deployment density differences in small-cells and WiFi APs
compared with macro-cells. Since small-cells generally have
a higher spectral efficiency and larger deployment density, we
assume λS > 1. WiFi APs typically have a higher deployment
density but lower spectral efficiency. Therefore, we don’t make
any assumptions on λU .
B. Market Model
Each SP i offers separate macro- and small- cell service.
It charges all users of a given service the same price per unit
rate, which are denoted by pi,M and pi,S for macro- and small-
cell service of provider i, respectively. Of course, other pricing
approaches arise in practice such as flat-rate pricing. We focus
on per unit pricing in part because it is analytically tractable
and in part because, as will be shown in our analysis, it is
3Equivalently, macro- and small-cells could operate in different time-slots,
e.g., using the Almost Blank Subframes (ABS) feature in LTE [18].
4Alternatively, we can view small-cells and WiFi APs as being uniformly
deployed over “hot spot” areas and restrict fixed users to these areas.
5Of course the actual rate a SP can provide at any time will depend on many
factors such as the channel gains to its users and the scheduling algorithm
employed. Here, we view Ci as averaging over such effects over a long
enough time horizon, which is reasonable for the network planning problems
we consider.
sufficient for optimizing the total user welfare. Recall, WiFi
service is assumed to have no access charge.
The density of users connected to macro-cells and small-
cells of SP i and to WiFi are denoted by Ki,M , Ki,S and KU ,
respectively. Note that Ki,S and KU only consist of fixed
users, while Ki,M may include both mobile users and fixed
users. Additionally, mobile users are assumed to have priority
connecting to macro-cells. As a result, macro-cells can only
accommodate fixed users if all mobile users have been served.
C. User Optimization
Each user is endowed with a utility function u(r), which
only depends on the service rate it gets from any type of
service. For simplicity of analysis, we assume that all users
have the same utility and we further restrict this to be an α-fair
utility functions [19] with α ∈ (0, 1):
u(r) =
r1−α
1− α, α ∈ (0, 1). (1)
This restriction enables us to explicitly calculate many equilib-
rium quantities, which appears to be difficult for more general
classes of utility. Further this class is widely used in both
networking and economics, where it is a subset of the class
of iso-elastic utility functions.6
For a given licensed service, each user requests a rate
that maximizes their net payoff W , defined as the difference
between their utility and the cost of service, i.e. they solve:
maximize
r≥0
W = u(r)− pr, (2)
where as described below, the SPs will set the prices p to
ensure that the resulting demand can be met.7 For WiFi
service, since there is no access charge, we assume all users
simply share the available total rate equally. Since fixed users
can choose any one service, they would choose the one with
the largest payoff.
For α-fair utility functions, (2) has the unique solution:
r∗ = D(p) = (u′)−1(p) = (1/p)1/α, (3)
where D(p) is the user’s rate demand function and u′ denotes
the first derivative of u. The maximum net payoff for a user
is thus:
W ∗(p) = u(D(p))− pD(p) = α
1− αp
1− 1α . (4)
6In general α-fair utilities require that α ≥ 0 to ensure concavity; requiring
α > 0 ensures strict concavity but allows us to approach the linear case as
α→ 0. The restriction of α < 1 ensures that utility is non-negative so that a
user can always “opt out” and receive zero utility. Note also that as α→ 1,
we approach the log(·) (proportional fair) utility function.
7We assume that the users are price taking in that they do not anticipate
how their selection of service or rate will effect the resulting prices, which is
reasonable under our assumption of many small users.
D. Service Provider Optimization
Each SP i needs to decide on the bandwidth partition
(Bi,M , Bi,S) and pricing decisions (pi,M , pi,S) to maximize
its revenue Si, i.e., the aggregate amount paid by all users
choosing its macro- and small- cell services. This can be
formulated as:
maximize Si = Ki,Mpi,MD(pi,M ) +Ki,Spi,SD(pi,S)
subject to Ki,MD(pi,M ) ≤ Ci,M ,Ki,SD(pi,S) ≤ Ci,S
0 ≤ pi,M , pi,S <∞
Bi,M , Bi,S ≥ 0, Bi,M +Bi,S ≤ Bi. (5)
Here the first constraint ensures that the SP can meet the rate
demanded by the users, where recall Ci,M and Ci,S depend
on the bandwidth allocation. Note also that Ki,M and Ki,S
will depend on the users associations, which in the case of
multiple SPs will depend on the prices and bandwidths chosen
by those SPs. Hence, we model the choice of bandwidth
allocations and prices as a game played among the SPs.
In practice, since bandwidth allocation takes place over a
slower time-scale than price adjustments, we view this game
as consisting of the following two stages: First, SPs determine
their bandwidth allocation between macro-cells and small-
cells. Then given their bandwidth allocation, SPs announce
prices for both macro- and small-cells. Users then choose the
services accordingly based on our association rules.
For such a game we characterize its sub-game perfect equi-
librium by first characterizing a user association equilibrium
in which SPs set prices given a fixed bandwidth allocation and
then study the equilibrium bandwidth allocation based on the
results obtained in the first step.
We also consider the choice of bandwidth allocations and
prices that maximize the social welfare, i.e. the sum utility
over all users. This can be formulated as maximizing
SW =
N∑
i=1
Ki,Mu(Ri,M ) +Ki,Su(Ri,S) +KUu(RU ) (6)
subject to the same constraints for each SP i as in (5). Here,
Ri,M , Ri,S and RU denote the average service rates per user
in each respective service, which in turn depends on the prices
and bandwidth allocations.
III. USER ASSOCIATION WITH A SINGLE SP
In this section we study the user association equilibrium
given a fixed bandwidth allocation between macro- and small-
cells by a single SP. Here we assume the SP maximizes
revenue, and consider social welfare maximization in Section
V. Since mobile users can only connect to macro-cells, we
need only consider the association of fixed users.
Given a fixed bandwidth allocation and annoucned prices,
users select their service to maximize their net payoff. For
macro- and small-cell service the net payoff for a user is
given by (4). Since W ∗(p) is a decreasing function of p, the
choice between macro- and small-cell networks, ignoring the
unlicensed network, is simply the one with the lower price.
For the WiFi service, the users net payoff is simply given
by u(CUKU ). With non-atomic users, it follows that in any user
association equilibrium the net payoffs of any services that are
used by fixed users must be equal, and any service not used
must have a lower net payoff.
The SP adjusts the prices pM and pS to maximize its
revenue taking into account the user association equilibrium.
8 Two scenarios are possible:
1. Mixed service: Macro-cells serve both mobile users and a
subset of fixed users;
2. Separate service: Macro-cells only serve mobile users.
Theorem 1 (User Association): Given a fixed bandwidth
allocation between macro- and small-cells, at the SPs’ optimal
prices, the market clears, i.e., all users are served, and all rate
is allocated. Further, there exists a threshold BS,0 such that if
BS < BS,0, then the mixed service scenario holds. Otherwise,
the separate service scenario holds.
For the mixed service scenario, pM = pS , whereas for the
separate service scenario pM > pS .
Hence, fixed users choose to associate with macro-cells
only when the small-cell bandwidth is sufficiently small. In
equilibrium the mixed service scenario implies that the net
payoff to fixed users from connecting to macro-, small-cells
and WiFi must be the same, and so we can write
u
(CS
KS
)
− pS CS
KS
= u
(CU
KU
)
= u
(CM
KM
)
− pM CM
KM
, (7)
Note here we are using the fact from Theorem 1 that all of the
rate is allocated. For separate service the same equality will
hold except only for small-cells and unlicensed. With α-fair
utilities, the rate per user CSKS must satisfy (3). Using this in
the above equations yields the following lemma that gives a
useful comparison of the equilibrium rates of each service.
Lemma 1: In equilibrium fixed users in licensed spectrum
(macro-/small-cells) achieve 1κ times the average rate of users
in unlicensed spectrum where κ = α1/(1−α).
Note that 1/κ > 1, which accounts for the access price
charged in licensed spectrum. Interestingly with α-fair utilities
this ratio is independent of any system parameters.
Using this quantity κ we can express the bandwidth thresh-
old in Theorem 1 as
BS,0 = max (κNfBMR0 −NmCU , 0) /(κNmλSR0). (8)
From Theorem 1, since all users are served we have KU +
KS+KM = Nm+Nf . Using this and Lemma 1, we have the
following explicit expressions for the equilibrium densities of
users for each type of service in the mixed service scenario:
KU = (Nf +Nm)
CU
CU + κ(CM + CS)
,
KM = (Nf +Nm)
κCM
CU + κ(CM + CS)
,
KS = (Nf +Nm)
κCS
CU + κ(CM + CS)
.
(9)
8Here we drop the SP subscript i.
Similarly, for the separate service scenario, we have:
KM = Nm, KS = Nf
κCS
κCS + CU
,
KU = Nf
CU
κCS + CU
.
(10)
IV. BANDWIDTH ALLOCATION WITH A SINGLE SP
We now consider optimal bandwidth allocation given the
prices and user association equilibrium in the preceding sec-
tion. In the mixed service scenario, this is given by:
maximize S = (BM + λSBS)R0u
′( (BM + λSBS)R0
KM +KS
)
subject to BM , BS ≥ 0, BM +BS ≤ B,BS < BS,0.
where the objective is revenue, KM ,KS are given in (9), and
BS,0 is defined in (8).
In the separate service scenario, the objective becomes
S = BMR0u
′(BMR0
KM
)
+ λSBSR0u
′(λSBSR0
KS
)
(11)
where KM ,KS are given in (10), and the constraint BS ≥
BS,0 applies.
Theorem 2 (Monopoly Bandwidth Allocation): The op-
timal bandwidth allocation is unique and always corresponds
to the separate service scenario.
The optimal bandwidth allocation (BrevS , B
rev
M ) can be deter-
mined by solving the necessary conditions given in Appendix
B. Although the solution must be computed numerically, some
general properties are easily established. First, BrevM > 0
(always), but BrevS > 0 if and only if CU < C
rev
U (otherwise
BrevS = 0), where
C revU =
κNfBR0
Nm
( λS
1− α
) 1
α
. (12)
When α→ 0+ or α→ 1−, C revU → +∞. That is, as the utility
function becomes either linear or logarithmic, the SP always
allocates some bandwidth to small-cells.
The optimal bandwidth allocation with no unlicensed spec-
trum can be determined by setting CU = 0. We will denote
all associated quantities with a tilde, i.e., (B˜revS , B˜
rev
M ) is the
optimized bandwidth with CU = 0. With no unlicensed
spectrum, it is straightforward to show that B˜revS = β˜B where
β˜ =
Nf
Nf+Nmλ
1−1/α
S
, so that B˜revS > 0 and B˜
rev
M > 0. In contrast,
with unlicensed spectrum the additional competition can cause
a revenue-maximizing SP to abandon small-cells altogether.
We will see a more drastic example of this effect when we
consider competing SPs.
The next theorem compares the amount of bandwidth allo-
cated to small-cells with and without unlicensed spectrum.
Theorem 3 (Bandwidth Allocation Comparison):
There exists a threshold CthU such that when CU < C
th
U ,
BrevS > B˜
rev
S , and when CU > C
th
U , B
rev
S < B˜
rev
S , where
CthU = β
∗κλSB˜revS R0 with β
∗ being the unique strictly
positive solution of
(1− α)(1 + β)1+α − β = 1− α. (13)
Furthermore, the SP’s revenue is always less with unlicensed
spectrum than without.
The last part of Theorem 3 is expected since unlicensed
access competes with the SP for fixed users. The first part
can be explained as follows. Compared to the case without
unlicensed spectrum, when unlicensed spectrum is present if
the SP keeps its bandwidth allocation the same, then it will
clearly lose revenue as fewer users will use its small-cell
service. To improve its revenue it could decrease BS , shifting
more resources to mobile users to make more revenue from
them or it could increase BS to make its small-cell service
more attractive and try to win back some users from the
unlicensed network. However, increasing BS also results in a
decrease in pS since the service rate per user increases (and a
loss in revenue from the mobile users). When CU is small, this
decrease in pS is smaller since more users will switch to the
small-cells making the second option more attractive. When
CU is large enough, fewer users will switch to the small-cells
per unit of additional bandwidth, making the first option more
profitable.
When α → 0+, κ → 0+ (so that α-fair utility function
becomes the linear utility function), β∗ → 0+, and therefore,
CthU → 0+. This implies that the SP should always invest less
bandwidth to small-cells compared with the scenario without
unlicensed spectrum. However, in this case the SP should still
invest almost all bandwidth to small-cells, i.e., BrevS → B. This
is because α = 0 effectively corresponds to maximizing the
sum rate. (This can be seen directly from the revenue function.)
When α → 1−, the utility function becomes logarithmic,
κ → e−1, and β∗ → ∞, so that CthU → ∞. Hence, the SP
should allocate more bandwidth to small-cells with unlicensed
spectrum. Again, in the limit the SP allocates all bandwidth
to small-cells, i.e., BrevS → B. We can see this by rewriting
the revenue function as follows:
S = BMR0u
′(BMR0
KM
)
+ λSBSR0u
′(λSBSR0
KS
)
= KMRMu
′
(RM ) +KSRSu
′
(RS). (14)
For a log-utility function the revenue per mobile user
RMu
′
(RM ) and revenue per fixed user RSu
′
(RS) become
constants and are equal. Therefore maximizing revenue is
equivalent to maximizing KM and KS . As a result, the SP
allocates an arbitrarily small amount of bandwidth to the
macro-cells to guarantee that all mobile users are served,
and the remaining bandwidth to small-cells to maximize
KS . In contrast, with no unlicensed access β˜ converges to
Nf
Nf+Nm
< 1 and limα→1− B˜revS < B.
V. SOCIAL WELFARE MAXIMIZATION
Now we change the objective function to social welfare and
analyze the corresponding prices, user association equilibrium
and bandwidth allocation.
Theorem 4 (Social Welfare Maximization): Given a sin-
gle social welfare maximizing SP, in equilibrium we have the
following properties:
1. The prices and user association are the same as for revenue
maximization stated in Theorem 1.
2. The optimal bandwidth allocation is unique and corresponds
to separate service.
3. Compared to the scenario without unlicensed spectrum, with
unlicensed spectrum the SP always allocates less bandwidth
to small-cells and more bandwidth to macro-cells.
Similar with revenue maximization, the optimal bandwidth
allocation (BswS , B
sw
M ) can be determined by solving the nec-
essary conditions given in Appendix D. Also, it can be shown
that BswM > 0 (always), and B
sw
S > 0 if and only if CU < C
sw
U
(otherwise BS = 0), where
CswU =
κNfBR0
[
(α+ 1)λS
] 1
α
Nm
. (15)
As α → 0, CswU → +∞, i.e., in the limiting case of a
linear utility function, the SP always allocates some bandwidth
to small-cells, even if CU is large. Similar with revenue
maximization, this is because this maximizes the total rate.
When α → 1, CswU → 2e−1λS NfBR0Nm (as opposed to infinity
for revenue maximization). With no unlicensed spectrum,
B˜swS > 0 and B˜
sw
M > 0.
Part 3) in Theorem 4 is due to the additional resources
in the unlicensed network. Since fixed users are better off
with unlicensed spectrum, to maximize the sum utility over
all users, the SP allocates more bandwidth to the macro-cells.
We emphasize that with unlicensed spectrum, Theorems 3
and 4 imply that the optimal bandwidth allocation is different
for revenue and social welfare maximization. That is, the
corresponding necessary conditions generally have different
solutions. In contrast, without unlicensed access, revenue
and social welfare maximization give the same bandwidth
allocation for α-fair utility functions shown in our previous
work [9].
Figure 1 shows an example of the optimal bandwidth
allocation for different α’s as the rate offered by the unli-
censed network increases. Curves are shown for both revenue
and social welfare maximization. The system parameters are
Nf = Nm = 50, R0 = 50, and λS = 4. For revenue
maximization, the curve initially increases for small CU , and
then decreases. In contrast, for social welfare maximization,
the curve is monotonically decreasing.
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Fig. 1. Optimal bandwidth allocation to small-cells for a single SP versus
total unlicensed capacity.
VI. SERVICE COMPETITION AMONG MULTIPLE SPS
In this section we study service competition among N > 1
SPs and investigate the corresponding sub-game perfect equi-
librium with unlicensed spectrum. Users choose the service
(macro-/small-/unlicensed) which yields the largest net pay-
off, and they fill the corresponding capacity accordingly. In
licensed spectrum, if multiple services offer the same price,
then the users are allocated across them in proportion to the
capacities. Once a particular service’s capacity is exhausted,
then the leftover demand continues to fill the remaining
services in the same fashion. In unlicensed spectrum, fixed
users always get an average rate equal to the total rate divided
by the mass of fixed users associated with that network.
We again consider a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium
consisting of (i) A price equilibrium given a fixed bandwidth
allocation; and (ii) An optimized bandwidth allocation given
that prices are set according to (i). As for the scenario with
a single SP, given a set of prices and bandwidth allocations,
the user association equilibrium falls in one of two categories:
a mixed service equilibrium in which all macro-cells serve
both mobile and a subset of fixed users, and separate service
equilibrium in which the macro-cells serve only mobile users.
The next theorem generalizes Theorem 1 to multiple SPs.
Theorem 5 (Price Equilibrium with Multiple SPs):
Given fixed bandwidth allocations for all SPs, there is a
unique price equilibrium which clears the market. Further if
N∑
i=1
Bi,S <
max
(
κNf
N∑
i=1
Bi,MR0 −NmCU , 0
)
κNmλSR0
then a mixed service equilibrium holds. Otherwise, the sepa-
rate service equilibrium holds.
For the mixed service scenario, pi,M = pi,S for each SP i;
in the separate service case, all SPs i charge the same pi,M
and pi,S , with pi,M > pi,S .
The next theorem characterizes the equilibrium for the
bandwidth allocation stage and thus the overall sub-game
perfect Nash equilibrium for the game. Before stating this
we define the following types of equilibria: A Macro-Small
Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) is one where all SPs allocate
bandwidth to both macro- and small-cells. A Macro-Preferred
Nash Equilibrium (MPNE) is one where some SPs allocate
bandwidth to both macro- and small-cells and the remaining
SPs allocate bandwidth to macro-cells only. Finally, a Macro-
only Nash Equilibrium (MNE) is one where all SPs allocate
bandwidth to macro-cells only.
Theorem 6 (Nash Equilibrium): There always exists a
unique sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium and it corresponds
to the separate service scenario. In the equilibrium fixed users
in small-cells achieve a higher average rate than mobile users
in macro-cells. Moreover, this Nash equilibrium can only be
one of the following types: an MSNE, an MPNE or an MNE.
If there is no unlicensed spectrum, then for the α-fair utility
function only an MSNE exists and it is always efficient,
i.e., maximizes social welfare [14]. Here, the presence of
unlicensed access can cause a subset of the SPs to engage
in macro-service only. Further, for any number of SPs, it can
be shown that, in general, none of the equilibrium categories
(including MSNE) are efficient. Figure 2 illustrates the Nash
equilibrium regions for two SPs as a function of the available
bandwidths B1 and B2. When B1 and B2 are sufficiently large,
then the equilibrium is an MSNE, whereas if B1 and/or B2
become sufficiently small, the equilibrium transitions so that
at least one SP serves only mobile users.
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Fig. 2. Nash equilibrium regions for 2 SPs. The system parameters are
α = 0.5, Nm = Nf = 50, R0 = 50, λS = 4, λW = 3, BU = 1.
Proposition 1 (MSNE Properties): Assuming an MSNE,
for any two SPs i and j with total bandwidth Bi and Bj , the
following properties hold:
1) Symmetry: If Bi = Bj , then each SP’s bandwidth allocation
must be the same, i.e., Bi,S = Bj,S , Bi,M = Bj,M .
2) Monotonicity: If Bi > Bj , then SP i allocates more
bandwidth to both macro- and small-cells than SP j, i.e.,
Bi,S > Bj,S , Bi,M > Bj,M .
Denote the total bandwidth allocated to small-cells by all
SPs with and without unlicensed spectrum as BS and B˜S ,
respectively.
Proposition 2 (MSNE Bandwidth Comparison): If an
MSNE exists with unlicensed access, then BS < B˜S .
Hence, for the MSNE case, competing SPs reduce the
bandwidth allocation to small-cells when unlicensed spectrum
is introduced.
Proposition 3 (MNE Conditions): An MNE holds if and
only if
CU ≥ R0
∑N
i=1Bi(
1− α Bmax∑N
i=1 Bi
) 1
α
κNfλ
1
α
S
Nm
, (16)
where Bmax = max{Bi : i ∈ N}.
For N = 1 (monopoly) this condition yields the threshold
in (12) so that the SP allocates no bandwidth to small-cells.
VII. UNLICENSED BANDWIDTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE
In this section we study the effect of increasing unlicensed
bandwidth on social welfare. Using the preceding framework,
we can determine the specific mix of unlicensed/licensed
spectrum such that the market equilibrium yields the same
social welfare as that achieved by a social planner. This is
motivated by the scenario in which a spectrum regulator,
such as the FCC, must determine how much newly available
spectrum will be licensed or unlicensed. We assume a total
available bandwidth B and consider the following scenarios:
1) Efficient allocation: A social planner determines the
bandwidth allocation to macro-cells BM , small-cells BS , and
unlicensed network BU that maximizes total utility. We will
denote the optimal allocation as BoptM , B
opt
S , B
opt
U , and use the
corresponding social welfare as a benchmark.
2) Market equilibrium: Here a social planner determines the
bandwidth assigned to licensed spectrum BL and unlicensed
spectrum BU . Each of the N SPs operating in licensed spec-
trum obtains the same portion of total bandwidth Bi ≡ BLN ,
and then further determines the split of Bi between BiM and
BiS to maximize its revenue. This scenario corresponds to the
more practical setting in which the regulator sets aside part of
the available bandwidth as unlicensed, and grants licenses for
the remainder. We will denote the bandwidths that maximize
social welfare in this scenario as B∗L, B
∗
U .
In the first scenario the social planner determines the
bandwidth assignment without explicit pricing. The optimal
bandwidth allocation equalizes the marginal utility for mobile
and fixed users. It is easy to verify that the efficient allocation
corresponds to separate service. In the market equilibrium
scenario, we will use the results from Sections IV and VI
to determine the optimal bandwidth assignments. We will
also present social welfare curves for the asymptotic regime
of many SPs, i.e., as N → ∞, for which we will use the
characterization below (full version in Appendix G).
Proposition 4: If we have
BUλU > B
κNfλ
1
α
S
Nm
, (17)
then there exists an N∗(BUλU ) such that for all N >
N∗(BUλU ) we have an MNE. Otherwise, we always have
an MSNE (Bi,M > 0 and Bi,S > 0 ∀ i ∈ N , and ∀ N ).
Given newly available bandwidth B, the optimal split into
licensed and unlicensed subbands depends on the relative
values of λS and λU (proofs in Appendix I). We have the
following cases:
a) λS > λU : In this case an efficient allocation by a social
planner would assign all spectrum to macro- and small-cells,
i.e., there is no unlicensed network. The optimal bandwidth
assignment is then:
BoptM =
NmB
Nm + µSNf
, BoptS =
µSNfB
Nm + µSNf
, BoptU = 0, (18)
where µS := λ
1
α−1
S . This is also true for the market equilib-
rium since it is shown in [9], [14] that without unlicensed
spectrum, maximizing revenue is the same as maximizing
social welfare for α-fair utility functions, independent of N .
Hence in this case the market equilibrium achieves the efficient
allocation.
b) λS = λU : In this case the social planner only needs to
consider the bandwidth assigned to macro-cells; the bandwidth
split between small-cells and unlicensed access can be arbi-
trary. Here the optimal assignment satisfies
BoptM =
NmB
Nm + µSNf
, BoptS +B
opt
U =
µSNfB
Nm + µSNf
, (19)
where µS = λ
1
α−1. This includes the two extremes (BoptS >
0, BoptU = 0) and (B
opt
S = 0, B
opt
U > 0). Hence for the
market equilibrium case, an optimal bandwidth assignment
strategy is to allocate all bandwidth as licensed. As in case
a), this achieves the efficient allocation. However, here there
may exist another efficient allocation in which the fixed users
are served by the unlicensed network. For the competing
SPs, that corresponds to an MNE, i.e., the SPs only allocate
their licensed bandwidth to the macro-cells (Bi,S = 0 for all
i ∈ N ).
The bandwidth allocation corresponding to this second
optimal assignment, along with the condition for its existence,
is
B∗L =
NmB
Nm + µSNf
, B∗U =
µSNfB
Nm + µSNf
,
if N ≥ 2 or N = 1 and 0 < α ≤ 0.5.
For N = 1, if α ∈ (0.5, 1), then this second optimal point
does not exist and the unique optimal bandwidth allocation
corresponds to no unlicensed spectrum. All other bandwidth
assignments yield lower social welfare.
c) λS < λU : In this case a social planner assigns spectrum
to the macro-cell and unlicensed networks only; there is no
small-cell network. The optimal allocation is:
BoptM =
NmB
Nm + µUNf
, BoptS = 0, B
opt
U =
µUNfB
Nm + µUNf
, (20)
where µU = λ
1
α−1
U . For the market equilibrium, allocating
all bandwidth to licensed spectrum no longer achieves the
efficient allocation. The only possibility for achieving an
efficient allocation, then, is to allocate BoptU to unlicensed
access. This achieves the efficient allocation if and only if
the corresponding equilibrium is an MNE. The corresponding
bandwidth assignment, along with the condition that guaran-
tees its existence are:
B∗L =
NmB
Nm + µUNf
, B∗U =
µUNfB
Nm + µUNf
,
if N ≥ 2 or N = 1 and 0 < α ≤ α0,
where 0 < α0 < 1 is the unique solution to κα λSλU + α = 1.
All other bandwidth assignments yield lower social welfare.
Also, for N = 1, if α ∈ (α0, 1), then the optimal bandwidth
allocation is not efficient.9
To summarize, in contrast to the results of [9], [14], with
the addition of unlicensed spectrum it is possible to achieve
efficiency only with a specific split of licensed and unlicened
spectrum, even as N → ∞ (perfect competition). Moreover,
9The market equilibrium does achieve the efficient allocation whenBU = 0
[9], [14]. Here we have that for the efficient allocation BU > 0.
when λS < λU , the optimal bandwidth assignment (when it
exists) is an MNE.
Figures 3-5 illustrate the preceding observations. They show
social welfare versus the amount of unlicensed bandwidth for
total bandwidth B = 2, Nf = Nm = 50, R0 = 50, and λS =
4. Each figure shows four plots corresponding to the efficient
allocation (straight line), monopoly SP, two competitive SPs,
and perfect competition.
Figure 3 illustrates case b), where α = 0.5 is chosen so
that two different bandwidth assignments give the efficient
allocation for all scenarios. We also compute BoptU = 1.6,
CswU
λUR0
=: BswU ≈ 1.39, and C
rev
U
λUR0
=: BrevU = 1.6. A
social welfare maximizing monopolist would start ignoring
small-cells when BU ≈ 1.39, while a revenue maximizing
monopolist takes the same action exactly at the value of BU
where social welfare is maximized.
Figure 4 illustrates case c) where a monopolist can be
efficient ( λSλU = 0.4, α = 0.8). Here B
rev
U ≈ 1.16, BoptU ≈ 1.28
and BswU ≈ 0.56, so that both a social welfare or revenue
maximizing monopolist abandon small-cells for small enough
values of BU . Figure 5 illustrates case c) where a monopolist
is not efficient ( λSλU =
8
9 , α = 0.8). Here B
rev
U ≈ 1.51, BoptU ≈
1.19 and BswU ≈ 0.92. Note that the revenue maximization
objective makes the monopolist abandon small-cells only for
large BU , well after B
opt
U .
We do not plot an example for case a) as it is easily under-
stood. When λS > λU , all scenarios achieve the maximum
social welfare when all bandwidth is allocated to licensed
spectrum. This is because when BU = 0, from [9], [14]
maximizing revenue is the same as maximizing social welfare
for any N .
We make several observations from the figures. First, the
three curves corresponding to the market scenarios (N = 1, 2,
and N → ∞) all have a “kink”, or turning point after which
the curves are concave with BU . This corresponds to the
transition from an MSNE to MNE (macro-cells only). That is,
to the right of the turning point bandwidth is allocated only to
macro-cells and unlicensed access, and the social welfare is
always concave in BU . For the MNE the social welfare is the
same for the three market scenarios, so that the three curves
overlap in this region, i.e., when BU becomes sufficiently
large. This common strictly concave function gives the sum
utility as function of BU if there are no small-cells. It can be
extended to all BU ∈ (0, B) and has a unique maximizer in
(0, B).
When λS = λU , our results show that for α = 0.5 we
have two optimal points. Therefore in Fig. 3 the curves first
decrease and then increase to the second optimal point as
part of the concave function we previously described. When
λS < λU , with a small amount of bandwidth allocated to
unlicensed spectrum, we obtain slightly more rate, but this
does not maximize social welfare, and so the social welfare
decreases. However, when we increase BU , the fixed users’
utility increases with rate, and this effect dominates even
though we are not allocating the rate efficiently. As a result, the
social welfare goes up again. As BU approaches B, mobile
users in macro-cells suffer and therefore the social welfare
decreases again.
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Fig. 3. Social welfare versus unlicensed bandwidth with λS = λU .
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Fig. 4. Social welfare versus BU with λS < λU . Here a monopolist can
be efficient.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
We have presented a model for allocating bandwidth in a
HetNet with both licensed and unlicensed spectrum, taking
into account the pricing strategies of the SPs. Our results
characterize the equilibrium allocations assuming that the SPs
maximize revenue or social welfare. For a monopoly SP that
maximizes revenue, we show that the presence of a small
amount of unlicensed spectrum may cause the SP to allocate
more bandwidth to its competing small-cell network. However,
when maximizing social welfare the SP always allocates less
bandwidth with unlicensed spectrum. With multiple competing
SPs the (unique) equilibrium is one of three different types,
depending on the system parameters, including one in which
the SPs do not allocate any bandwidth to a small-cell network
(e.g., when the available bandwidth is small). We observe
that in general, these equilibria do not achieve an efficient
allocation corresponding to the maximum social welfare even
when the number of competing SPs is large. In contrast,
without unlicensed spectrum the equilibrium is always efficient
for the class of α-fair utility functions considered here.
We have used this framework to analyze the effect of
unlicensed bandwidth on social welfare. If the small-cell
network offers higher spectral efficiency than the unlicensed
network, then according to our model, allocating all of the
bandwidth as licensed is efficient. Otherwise, if the unlicensed
network offers higher spectral efficiency, then we observe that
there is a unique mix of unlicensed and licensed spectrum that
maximizes social welfare, but that mix may or may not be
efficient when the licensed spectrum is allocated to revenue-
maximizing SPs.
In practice, a newly deployed licensed small-cell network
may be based on LTE or WiFi, and the unlicensed (open
access) network may be based on WiFi or LTE-U. Given
the same density of access points, a managed LTE network
would likely have the highest spectral efficiency, in which
case, according to our model, allocating bands as licensed will
maximize the social welfare. Of course, this assumes that the
utility of a band depends only on the offered rate. Advocates
of unlicensed spectrum have pointed to other properties, which
are not taken into account here, such as lowering barriers
to entry and the potential for developing new technologies
and business models.10 Also not taken into account here is
investment, which may pose different types of barriers to
entry in licensed versus unlicensed spectrum. Incorporating
investment within the framework presented here is left for
future work.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We only discuss the case of BS , BM > 0. The sub-cases of
either or both the variables being 0 follow a similar logic with
the obvious restriction of no users being served in the bands
with no bandwidth.
1. We first show that the market always clears, i.e., all users
would be served and the total rate supply is equal to the total
rate demand.
Since the WiFi network on unlicensed spectrum is free
to use, it’s obvious that all fixed users would be served. If
there are some mobile users that are not served yet, the SP
can increase the price in macro-cells so that users in macro-
cells would request less rate, leading to the SP having some
redundant rate to serve more mobile users. The SP can thus use
up its rate in macro-cells at a higher price since the unserved
mobile users would fill in, which then leads to larger revenue.
On the other hand, if all users are served but there is still
some redundant rate available in macro-cells or small-cells,
the SP can decrease the price in corresponding cells so that
users now request a higher rate. Since ru
′
(r), which is the
revenue gained per user, increases with r, it’s easy to see the
SP can gain more revenue by doing so.
As a result of the market clearing property we have the
following important conclusion. In both the macro-cells and
the small-cells, the per-user rate equals the allocated total rate
(bandwidth times the spectral efficiency) divided by the mass
of customers associated with macro-cells and the same-cells.
The price for access is given precisely by the inverse of the
demand function D(·) at this per-user rate.
2. We then prove the price choice and user association
equilibrium in the two different scenarios, given the fixed
bandwidth allocation.
Assume macro-cells only serve mobile users. This then
implies that RS ≥ RM so that the boundary point would
correspond to the point at which RS = RM holds. It can be
determined using the following steps.
KM = Nm (21)
u
(λSBSR0
KS
)
− λSBSR0
KS
u
′(λSBSR0
KS
)
= u
( CU
Nf −KS
)
(22)
RS =
λSBSR0
KS
= RM =
BMR0
KM
(23)
The above equation simplify to
BS =
κNfBMR0 −NmCU
κλSNmR0
=: B0S . (24)
Therefore if BS is larger than B0S , it’s easy to see that
the user equilibrium must be such that macro-cells only serve
mobile users. In contrast, if BS is smaller than B0S , then RS <
RM holds assuming macro-cells only serve mobile users. As a
result, some fixed users would have the incentive to associate
with macro-cells and we would next prove that in this case
at user equilibrium it’s indeed the case that some fixed users
would associate with macro-cells.
Suppose BS < B0S and if macro-cells only serve mobile
users such that the market clears, then we have pM < pS . The
SP can then increases the price to p
′
M , where pM < p
′
M < pS ,
so that the mobile obtain a smaller rate creating some spare
capacity. As a result, some fixed users in small-cells and WiFi
network would switch to macro-cells, denote the total mass
as δ and the mass of fixed users from small-cells switching
being δ′ ≤ δ. Note that before the price change KM = Nm.
The resulting revenue of the SP would then be :
S =BMR0u
′(
RM
Nm
Nm + δ
)
+ λSBSR0u
′(
RS
KS
KS − δ′
)
By Lemma 1 we can rewrite the revenue as:
S =BMR0u
′(
RM
Nm
Nm + δ
)
+ λSBSR0u
′(
RS
Nf
Nf − δ
)
Then we have:
∂S
∂δ
= −R′M
2
u
′′
(R
′
M ) +
λSBSR0
Nf − δ R
′
Su
′′
(R
′
S)
= −R′M
2
u
′′
(R
′
M ) +
KS
Nf
λSBSR0
KS
Nf
Nf − δR
′
Su
′′
(R
′
S)
> −R′M
2
u
′′
(R
′
M ) +R
′
S
2
u
′′
(R
′
S),
where R′S = RS
KS
KS−δ′ = RS
Nf
Nf−δ and R
′
M = RM
Nm
Nm+δ
are the new per user rates in the small-cells and macro-cells,
respectively, after the shift of δ mass of fixed users to macro-
cells.
Based on our assumptions, r2u
′′
(r) = −αr1−α decreases
with r, therefore as long as R
′
S < R
′
M , i.e., p
′
M < p
′
S , S
always increases with δ. As a result, it’s always better for
macro-cells to serve some fixed users in this case and the
optimal price choice is pM = pS .
In mixed service scenario, we therefore have the following
equations:
u
(CS
KS
)
− pS CS
KS
= u
(CU
KU
)
= u
(CM
KM
)
− pM CM
KM
,
KU +KS +KM = Nm +Nf ,
D(pM ) = RM = D(pS) = RS =
CS + CM
KM +KS
.
(25)
Using Lemma 1 we can get:
KU = (Nf +Nm)
CU
CU + κ(CM + CS)
,
KM = (Nf +Nm)
κCM
CU + κ(CM + CS)
,
KS = (Nf +Nm)
κCS
CU + κ(CM + CS)
.
(26)
which gives the number of active users in terms of the network
capacities.
Similarly, for the separate service scenario, writing the
analogous conditions to (25) we can get:
KM = Nm, KS = Nf
κCS
κCS + CU
,
KU = Nf
CU
κCS + CU
.
(27)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
1. We first prove that the optimal bandwidth allocation
cannot occur at mixed service scenario. The revenue of the
SP under the mixed service scenario is:
S =(BM + λSBS)R0u
′( (BM + λSBS)R0
KM +KS
)
(28)
=(BM + λSBS)R0u
′(CU + κ(BM + λSBS)R0
κ(Nm +Nf )
)
(29)
=(Nm +Nf )Ru
′
(R)− CU
κ
u
′
(R) (30)
where R := CU+κ(BM+λSBS)R0κ(Nm+Nf ) is the average rate in both
macro-cells and small-cells.
Based on our assumptions, Ru
′
(R) increases with R and
u
′
(R) decreases with R, therefore it’s always beneficial to
allocate more bandwidth to small-cells: since λS > 1, R
increases with BS . This means the optimal point cannot exist
at a mixed service scenario.
2. We then prove the optimal bandwidth allocation scheme
in separate service scenario. The revenue of the SP at separate
service equilibrium is:
S =BMR0u
′(BMR0
KM
)
+ λSBSR0u
′(λSBSR0
KS
)
(31)
=NmRMu
′
(RM ) +NfRSu
′
(RS)− CU
κ
u
′
(RS) (32)
where RM = BMR0Nm , RS =
λSBSR0
KS
= κλSBSR0+CUκNf are the
average rate in macro-cells and small-cells, respectively.
It’s easy to verify for α-fair utility functions,
RMu
′
(RM ), RSu
′
(RS) are concave increasing functions with
respect to BM and BS , respectively. Furthermore, −u′(RS)
is also a concave increasing function with respect to BS . As
a result, S is a increasing with either BS or BM . Therefore
at optimal point the SP uses up all its total bandwidth and
we have BS + BM = 1. This further means S is concave
with BS . As a result, the optimal point occurs at the point
which uses up the total bandwidth and equalizes the marginal
revenue increase with respect to per unit bandwidth increase
in both macro-cells and small-cells, which can be achieved
by straightforward calculation given below:
1− α
λS
(BrevMR0
Nm
)−α
=
[(κλSBrevS R0 + CU
κNf
)−α
− α(κλSBrevS R0 + CU
κNf
)−α κλSBrevS R0
κλSB
rev
S R0 + CU
]
,
BrevS +B
rev
M = B, B
rev
S , B
rev
M ≥ 0.
(P1)
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We first make the following definitions:
A1 =
[
− ακλSBS
κλSBS + λUBU
(
κλSBS + λUBU
κNf
R0
)−α
(33)
+
(
κλSBS + λUBU
κNf
R0
)−α]
λS (34)
A2 =(1− α)λS
(
λSBSR0
Nf
)−α
(35)
We only need to compare A1 and A2 at B˜revS . By explicit
calculation, this is given by:
A1 −A2 = M
(κλSB˜
rev
S R0 + CU )
α+1(λSB˜
rev
S R0)
α
(36)
where M = (1 − α)[(κλSB˜revS R0)α+1 − (κλSB˜revS R0 +
CU )
α+1
]− CU (κλSB˜revS R0)α.
It’s easy to verify that M first increases with CU and
then decreases with CU . Moreover, M = 0 when CW = 0.
Therefore we only need to determine the other zero-crossing
point CthU by letting M = 0. The conclusions in Theorem 3
then follow in a straightforward manner.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
1. We first show that the market always clears, i.e., all users
would be served and the total rate supply is equal to the total
rate demand.
Since the WiFi network is free to use, again it’s obvious
that all fixed users would be served. If there are some mobile
users that are not served yet, the SP can increase the price in
macro-cells so that users in macro-cells would request less rate
and therefore it has some redundant rate to serve the mobile
users. Since the function KMu(CMKM ) increases with KM , the
social welfare is thus increased.
On the other hand, if all users are served but there is still
some redundant rate available in macro-cells or small-cells.
The SP can decrease the price in corresponding cells so that
users now request higher rate, which naturally leads to higher
social welfare.
2. We then prove the price choice and users association
equilibrium in two different scenarios, depending on the fixed
bandwidth allocation.
Similar to the analysis for revenue maximization, we first
prove that at certain fixed bandwidth allocation, if macro-cells
only serve mobile users and mobile users achieve larger rate
than fixed users in small-cells, then the final user association
should be that some fixed users associate with macro-cells and
the price in macro-cells and small-cells should be the same.
Suppose macro-cells only serve mobile users and we have
pM < pS , RM > RS . The SP can increase the macro-cell
price to p
′
M , where pM < p
′
M < pS . As a result, some fixed
users in small-cells and WiFi network would switch to macro-
cells, denote the mass of these fixed users as δ and Nt =
Nm+Nf = KM +KS +KU . By Lemma 1 we can show that
the social welfare would then be :
SW =(KM + δ)u
(
RM
KM
KM + δ
)
+KS
Nt −KM − δ
Nt −KM u
(
RS
Nt −KM
Nt −KM − δ
)
+KU
Nt −KM − δ
Nt −KM u
(
RU
Nt −KM
Nt −KM − δ
)
.
(37)
Then we have:
∂SW
∂δ
= u(R
′
M )−R
′
Mu
′
(R
′
M )−
KS
Nt −KM
[
u(R
′
S)−
R
′
Su
′
(R
′
S)
]
− KU
Nt −KM
[
u(R
′
U )−R
′
Uu
′
(R
′
U )
]
(38)
For the α-fair utility functions we use, it’s easy to verify that
u(r)−ru′(r) increases with r. We also have R′M > R
′
S > R
′
U ,
thus
∂SW
∂δ
> u(R
′
M )−R
′
Mu
′
(R
′
M )−
[
u(R
′
S)−R
′
Su
′
(R
′
S)
]
> 0.
Therefore the social welfare increases with δ in mixed
service scenario as long as pM < pS . As a result, in this
case some fixed users would associate with macro-cells, and
the optimal price choice will be pM = pS .
3. Next, we show that the optimal bandwidth allocation is
unique and only occurs at separate service scenario. The social
welfare at mixed service scenario is:
SW = (KM +KS)u(R) +KUu(RU ) (39)
where R = [λUBU+κ(BM+λSBS)]R0)κ(Nm+Nf ) , RU =
[λUBU+κ(BM+λSBS)]R0)
Nm+Nf
are the average user rate in
licensed and unlicensed spectrum, respectively. Therefore we
have:
SW =(KM +KS)u(R) +KUu(κR)
=(Nm +Nf )u(R)−KU (u(R)− u(κR))
=(Nm +Nf )u(R)− CU u(R)− u(κR)
κR
(40)
It’s easy to see that the first term is increasing with R. For α-
fair utility functions we use, it’s easy to verify the second term
is decreasing with R. Therefore the social welfare increases
with R, which leads to the conclusion that it’s always better to
invest more bandwidth to small-cells. As a result, the optimal
point cannot occur at mixed service scenario.
We then prove that the optimal bandwidth allocation is
unique at separate service scenario.
SW = Nmu(RM ) +KSu(RS) +KUu(RU )
RS =
κλSBSR0 + CU
κNf
, RU = κRS
KS =
λSBSR0
RS
,KU =
CU
RU
(41)
We then have:
SW = Nmu(RM ) +Nfu(RS) +
CU
κ
[
u(κRS)− u(RS)
RS
]
(42)
Since Nmu(RM ) is concave increasing with RM and both
Nfu(RS),
u(κRS)−u(RS)
RS
= −R−αS are concave increasing
with RS . It’s easy to verify that social welfare is increasing
with either BS or BM and therefore at optimal point we have
BS +BM = B. By this we can further show that it is also a
concave function with BS and therefore the optimal point is
unique. At this optimal point, SP uses up the total bandwidth
and equalizes the marginal social welfare increase of mobile
users and fixed users with respect to per unit of bandwidth
increase in macro-cells and small-cells. The optimal bandwidth
allocation can be calculated as follows:
{
(Nf )
αλS
(
(κα+κ)CU+κ
α+1λSB
sw
S R0
)
(κλSBswS R0+CU )
α+1 = (
BswMR0
Nm
)−α,
BswS +B
sw
M = 1, B
sw
S , B
sw
M ≥ 0.
(P3)
4. Last, we prove BswS < B˜
sw
S . We first define some
notations.
A3 =
(Nf )
αλS
[
(κα + κ)CU + κ
α+1λSB˜
∗
SR0
]
(κλSB˜∗SR0 + CU )α+1
A4 = λS
(λSB˜∗∗S R0
Nf
)−α
(43)
We only need to compare A3 and A4 at B˜swS . It turns out
that:
A3 −A4
λSR0(Nf )α
=
M
(λSB˜
sw
S R0)
α(κλSB˜
sw
S R0 + CU )
α+1
M = (κα + κ)CU (λSB˜
sw
S R0)
α + κα+1(λSB˜
sw
S R0)
α+1
− (κλSB˜swS R0 + CU )α+1 (44)
We then have:
∂M
∂CU
=(α+ 1)
[
(κλSB˜
sw
S R0)
α − (κλSB˜swS R0 + CU )α
]
<0, ∀CU > 0. (45)
Since when CU = 0, A3 = A4. Therefore A3 < A4 when
CU > 0. As a result, compared with the scenario without unli-
censed spectrum, the SP should always invest less bandwidth
to small-cells in terms of social welfare maximization.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
The proof is essentially the same as the proof for the price
choice and user association equilibrium for monopoly service
provider scenario. The only difference is that we need to prove
the prices must be equal across all small-cells or macro-cells
with multiple SPs.
Suppose one SP i has lower small-cell price pi,S than the
other SP j. SP i can increase the price to p
′
i,S satisfying pi,S <
p
′
i,S < pj,S . As a result, SP i would attract some users which
used to associate with SP j’s small-cell or some users from
unlicensed access and still use up all the rate with a higher
price. Therefore SP i can increase its revenue by doing so.
Thus, at price equilibrium all small-cell price must be equal.
The proof for all macro-cell prices must be equal is done
similarly.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 6
We prove the theorem in the following steps.
1. First, we prove that no Nash equilibrium exists at mixed
service scenario. It’s easy to see the revenue of SP i in this
case is:
Si = (Bi,M + λSBi,S)R0u
′[ N∑j=1(Bj,M + λSBj,S)R0
KM +KS
]
(46)
= (KM +KS)Ru
′
(R)−
N∑
j 6=i
(Bj,M + λSBj,S)R0u
′
(R)
(47)
KM +KS = Nm +Nf − (Nm +Nf )CU
CU + κ
N∑
j=1
(Bj,M + λSBj,S)R0
(48)
R =
CU + κ
N∑
j=1
(Bj,M + λSBj,S)R0
κ(Nm +Nf )
(49)
It’s easy to see that R and KM + KS both increase
with Bi,S . Meanwhile, Ru
′
(R) increases with R and u
′
(R)
decreases with R. As a result, Si increases with Bi,S and every
SP would have incentive to invest more bandwidth to small-
cells, which would finally push the equilibrium to separate
service scenario. Therefore no Nash equilibrium exists in
mixed service scenario.
2. We next prove that there always exists a Nash equilibrium
at separate service scenario. The revenue of SP i in this case
is:
Si =Si,M + Si,S
=Bi,MR0u
′
(RM ) + λSBi,SR0u
′
(RS)
=Bi,MR0u
′( N∑j=1Bj,MR0
Nm
)
+ λSBi,SR0u
′( N∑j=1λSBj,SR0
KS
)
(50)
It’s easy to verify:
∂Si,M
∂Bi,M
=R0
[
u
′
(RM ) +
Bi,MR0
Nm
u
′′
(RM )
]
=R0
[
u
′
(RM ) +RMu
′′
(RM )−
∑
j 6=i
Bj,MR0
Nm
u
′′
(RM )
]
>0 (51)
∂Si,S
∂Bi,S
=λSR0
[
u
′
(RS) +
λSBi,SR0
Nf
u
′′
(RS)
]
=λSR0
[
u
′
(RS) +
N∑
j=1
λSBj,SR0
Nf
u
′′
(RS)
−
∑
j 6=i
λSBj,SR0
Nf
u
′′
(RS)
]
=λSR0
[
u
′
(RS) +RSu
′′
(RS)
− λSCU
κNf
u
′′
(RS)−
∑
j 6=i
λSBj,SR0
Nf
u
′′
(RS)
]
> 0
(52)
Since u
′
(r) + ru
′′
(r) decreases with r and u
′′
(r) increases
with r, it’s easy to verify Si,M and Si,S are both concave
increasing with Bi,M and Bi,S respectively. This also indicates
all SPs would always use up their total bandwidth, i.e.,
Bi,S + Bi,M = BI . By this we can further show Si is
a concave function with Bi,S . Moreover, the constraint on
separate service scenario are linear with Bi,S . We can then
apply Rosen’s theorem on concave games [20] to prove the
existence of Nash equilibrium.
3. For the third step, we prove that fixed users in small-cells
achieve higher average rate than mobile users in macro-cells.
This is equivalent to say RS > RM at equilibrium.
We only need to rule out the possibility that RS = RM
since we already showed that the Nash equilibrium falls into
separate service scenario. Denote the group of SPs that only
allocate bandwidth to small-cells (macro-cells) as GS(GM )
and the group of SPs that allocate bandwidth to both cells as
GMS , then we have:
∀i ∈ GS , Bi,S = Bi, Bi,M = 0
∀j ∈ GM ∪GMS , ∂Sj
Bj,S
≤ 0 (53)
If RS = RM = R holds, then ∀j ∈ GM ∪GMS , we have:
∂Sj
∂Bj,S
=λSR0
[
u
′
(RS) +
λSBj,SR0
Nf
u
′′
(RS)
]
−R0
[
u
′
(RM ) +
Bj,MR0
Nm
u′′(RM )
]
=(λS − 1)u′(R) +
[λSBj,SR0
Nf
− Bj,MR0
Nm
]
u
′′
(R)
≤0 (54)
Therefore ∀j ∈ GM ∪GMS , we have:
λSBj,SR0
Nf
≥ Bj,MR0
Nm
(55)
As a result, the following holds:
RS =
∑
j∈GM∪GMS
λSBj,SR0
Nf
+
∑
i∈GS
λSBiR0
Nf
> (56)
∑
j∈GM∪GMS
Bj,MR0
Nm
= RM (57)
Therefore we have a contradiction.
4. We then show that at Nash equilibrium it is impossible
that one SP only allocates bandwidth to macro-cells while the
other SP only allocates bandwidth to small-cells.
Suppose SP i only allocates bandwidth to macro-cells while
SP j only allocates bandwidth to small-cells. Then we have:
∂Si
∂Bi,S
=λSR0u
′
(RS)−R0
[
u
′
(RM ) +
Bi,MR0
Nm
u′′(RM )
]
≤0 (58)
∂Sj
∂Bj,S
=λSR0
[
u
′
(RS) +
λSBj,SR0
Nf
u
′′
(RS)
]
−R0u′(RM )
≥0 (59)
which would yield:
−Bi,MR0
Nm
u′′(RM ) ≤ λS λSBj,SR0
Nf
u
′′
(RS) (60)
Clearly we have a contradiction then.
5. After step 4, it’s clear that there are only five possible
Nash equilibrium types:
1) Small-only Nash equilibrium(SNE): All SPs only allocate
bandwidth to small-cells.
2) Macro-only Nash equilibrium(MNE): All SPs only allo-
cate bandwidth to macro-cells.
3) Macro-Small Nash Equilibrium (MSNE): All SPs allocate
bandwidth to both macro- and small-cells.
4) Macro-Preferred Nash Equilibrium (MPNE): Some SPs
allocate bandwidth to both small– and macro-cells while
the other SPs only allocate bandwidth to macro-cells.
5) Small-Preferred Nash Equilibrium (SPNE): Some SPs
allocate bandwidth to both small– and macro-cells while
the other SPs only allocate bandwidth to small-cells.
We next prove that SNE cannot exist.
The marginal revenue increase with respect to per unit
bandwidth increase in macro-cells for SP i is given by:
∂Si
∂Bi,M
= R0
[
u
′
(RM ) +
Bi,MR0
Nm
u
′′
(RM )
]
(61)
It can be easily shown that for α-fair utility functions, the
marginal revenue increase with respect to per unit bandwidth
increase in macro-cells goes to infinity when BM is near 0.
As a result, SNE cannot exist.
However, the above argument doesn’t apply to MNE. At first
glance, it seems that when all SPs only allocate bandwidth to
macro-cells, the marginal revenue increase with respect to per
unit bandwidth in small-cells also goes to infinity when BS
is near 0. Actually, the marginal revenue increase does go to
infinity when RS is near 0. However, RS doesn’t go to 0 when
BS goes to 0. In fact, RS is discontinuous at the point 0. We
have the following:
RS =
κλSBSR0 + CU
κNf
, BS > 0; (62)
RS = 0, BS = 0. (63)
Therefore as BS → 0+, RS → CUκNf > 0.
6. The fact that SPNE cannot exist requires more work and
in this part we would focus on it. At SPNE, we know that
there exist SPs i, j such that:
∂Si
∂Bi,S
≥ 0, Bi,S = Bi, Bi,M = 0 (64)
∂Sj
∂Bj,S
= 0, Bj,S > 0, Bj,M > 0 (65)
We therefore have:
λF
[
u
′
(RS) +
λSBi,SR0
Nf
u′′(RS)
]
≥ u′(RM ) (66)
λS
[
u
′
(RS) +
λSBi,SR0
Nf
u′′(RS)
]
= u
′
(RM )+
Bi,MR0
Nm
u
′′
(RM ) (67)
From the first inequality above, we can easily conclude that:
λSu
′
(RS) > u
′
(RM ) (68)
Next, we consider the group of service providers that
allocate bandwidth to both cells, denoted as GMS and assume
|GMS | = L.
∀j ∈ GMS , ∂Sj
∂Bj,S
= 0, Bj,S > 0, Bj,M > 0 (69)
We then have:
λS
[
Lu
′
(RS) +
λS
∑
j∈GMS
Bj,SR0
Nf
u′′(RS)
]
=
Lu
′
(RM ) +
∑
j∈GMS
Bj,MR0
Nm
u
′′
(RM ) (70)
It’s easy to get:
λS
[
Lu
′
(RS) +
λS
∑
j∈N
Bj,SR0
Nf
u′′(RS)
]
<
Lu
′
(RM ) +RMu
′′
(RM ) (71)
Together with inequality 68, we can get the second inequal-
ity:
λS
[
u
′
(RS) +
λS
∑
j∈N
Bj,SR0
Nf
u′′(RS)
]
<
u
′
(RM ) +RMu
′′
(RM ) (72)
For α-fair utility functions, we have:
u
′
(RM ) +RMu
′′
(RM ) = (1− α)u′(RM ) (73)
However, we also have:
λS
[
u
′
(RS) +
λS
∑
j∈N
Bj,SR0
Nf
u′′(RS)
]
− (1− α)λSu′(RS)
= λS
[
αu
′
(RS) +
λS
∑
j∈N
Bj,SR0
Nf
u′′(RS)
]
> λS
[
αu
′
(RS) +RSu
′′(RS)
]
= λSαR
−α
S − λSαR−αS = 0 (74)
Therefore the two inequalities have a contradiction. As a
result, SPNE cannot exist.
7. We next prove that MSNE, MNE and MPNE cannot
coexist. First it’s easy to verify that at MSNE, MNE and
MPNE, we have the following:
MSNE : λS
[
Nu
′
(RS) +
λS
∑
i∈N
Bi,SR0
Nf
u
′′
(RS)
]
= Nu
′
(RM ) +RMu
′′
(RM ) (75)
MNE or MPNE : λS
[
Nu
′
(RS) +
λS
∑
i∈N
Bi,SR0
Nf
u
′′
(RS)
]
≤ Nu′(RM ) +RMu′′(RM ) (76)
We can show that the LHS is a decreasing function with
RS , since we have:
RS =
CU + κλS
∑
i∈N
Bi,SR0
κNf
(77)
Therefore we have:
LHS =λS
[
u
′
(RS) +RSu
′′
(RS)
]
+ (N − 1)λSu′(RS)
(78)
− λSCU
κNf
u
′′
(RS) (79)
which is decreasing with RS .
Similarly, RHS is also a decreasing function with RM .
Now suppose for the same set of parameters, we have one
MNE or MPNE and another MSNE, denote the corresponding
bandwidth allocation profile as B and B¯, respectively. Then
we must have:
R¯S ≤ RS , R¯M ≥ RM (80)
Now it is clearly shown that MNE and MSNE cannot coexist
since for MNE we have RM > R¯M .
If B corresponds to MPNE, we can conclude that at MSNE,
some SPs must have less bandwidth allocation to small-cells
than that of MPNE. Denote this group of SPs as GS− and
assume |GMS−| = L, we have:
∀j ∈ GS−, ∂Sj
∂Bj,S
= 0,
∂S¯j
∂B¯j,S
≤ 0 (81)
Summing up, we get:
λS
[
Lu
′
(RS) +
λS
∑
j∈GS−
Bj,SR0
Nf
u
′′
(RS)
]
=
Lu
′
(RM ) +
∑
j∈GS−
Bj,MR0
Nm
u
′′
(RM ) (82)
λS
[
Lu
′
(R¯S) +
λS
∑
j∈GS−
¯Bj,SR0
Nf
u
′′
(R¯S)
]
≤
Lu
′
(R¯M ) +
∑
j∈GS−
¯Bj,MR0
Nm
u
′′
(R¯M ) (83)
Rearranging some of the terms, we have:
λS
[
Lu
′
(RS) +
λS
∑
j∈N
Bj,SR0
Nf
u
′′
(RS)
]
=
Lu
′
(RM ) +RMu
′′
(RM ) + λS
λS
∑
j /∈GS−
Bj,SR0
Nf
u
′′
(RS)
−
∑
j /∈GS−
Bj,MR0
Nm
u
′′
(RM ) (84)
λS
[
Lu
′
(R¯S) +
λS
∑
j∈N
¯Bj,SR0
Nf
u
′′
(R¯S)
]
≤
Lu
′
(R¯M ) + R¯Mu
′′
(R¯M ) + λS
λS
∑
j /∈GS−
¯Bj,SR0
Nf
u
′′
(R¯S)
−
∑
j /∈GS−
¯Bj,MR0
Nm
u
′′
(R¯M ) (85)
However, we also have:
∀j 6∈ GS−, ¯Bj,S ≥ Bj,S , ¯Bj,M ≤ Bj,M (86)
We already showed that LHS decreases with RS and the
first two terms on RHS decreases with RM . For α-fair utility
functions, u
′′
(r) < 0 increases with r. Combining with the
fact that R¯S ≤ RS , R¯M ≥ RM and noticing that at least
one of the inequalities must be strict inequality, we can also
conclude:
λS
[
Lu
′
(R¯S) +
λS
∑
j∈N
¯Bj,SR0
Nf
u
′′
(R¯S)
]
>
Lu
′
(R¯M ) + R¯Mu
′′
(R¯M ) + λS
λS
∑
j /∈GS−
¯Bj,SR0
Nf
u
′′
(R¯S)
−
∑
j /∈GS−
¯Bj,MR0
Nm
u
′′
(R¯M ) (87)
Clearly we have a contradiction then. As a result, MSNE
and MPNE cannot coexist.
We then only need to show MNE and MPNE cannot coexist.
It can be proved in a similar way as we proved MSNE and
MPNE cannot coexist introduced above. We now focus on the
group of SPs which decrease bandwidth allocation to small-
cells and apply the same procedures to get a contradiction.
8. Finally, we need to show that within MSNE, MNE or
MPNE, the Nash equilibrium is unique.
The uniqueness of MNE is trivial.
The uniqueness of MPNE can be proved in a similar way
in which we proved MSNE and MPNE cannot coexist. Here
we don’t repeat the steps.
The uniqueness of MSNE can also be proved similarly.
However, here we use another method. It’s easy to see that
at MSNE, we have the following system of equations.
λS [Nu
′
(RS) +
λS
∑
i∈N
Bi,SR0
Nf
u
′′
(RS)]
= Nu
′
(RM ) +RMu
′′
(RM )
λ2S∆Bij,S
Nf
u
′′
(RS) =
∆Bij,M
Nm
u
′′
(RM )
where ∆Bij,S = Bi,S − Bj,S is the difference of bandwidth
allocation to small-cells between SP i and SP j, the same for
∆Bij,M .
By the monotonicity of both LHS and RHS with respect
to RS and RM , the first equation we can uniquely determine
N∑
i=1
Bi,S . While the second equation characterizes the rela-
tionship of Bi,S between any pair of service providers, as a
result the above equation system is essentially a linear equation
system with N unknowns and N independent linear equations.
Thus if there is a solution to the equation system, it must be
unique.
APPENDIX G
MSNE CONDITIONS AND PROPERTIES
The bandwidth allocation at an MSNE can be computed via
the following system of equations:
λS [Nu
′
(RS) +
λS
∑
i∈N
Bi,SR0
Nf
u
′′
(RS)]
= Nu
′
(RM ) +RMu
′′
(RM )
λ2S∆Bij,S
Nf
u
′′
(RS) =
∆Bij,M
Nm
u
′′
(RM )
where ∆Bij,S = Bi,S − Bj,S is the difference of bandwidth
allocation to small-cells between SP i and SP j, the same for
∆Bij,M .
Proposition 3 results in the following corollary in the
symmetric setting where all SPs have the same bandwidths,
i.e., Bi ≡ B for all i ∈ N .
Corollary 1: If all SPs have the same bandwidths B and
CU ≥ R0NB
(
λS
1− αN
) 1
α κNf
Nm
, (88)
then we have an MNE with
KM = Nm,KS = 0,KU = Nf ,
RM =
NBR0
Nm
, RS = 0, RU =
CU
Nf
.
(89)
Otherwise we have an MSNE in which all SPs have the same
bandwidth allocation and can be determined by solving the
following equations(
1− α
N
)(
Nm
NBMR0
)α
=
(
κNf
κNBSλSR0 + CU
)α
× λS
(
1− α κλSBSR0
κNBSλSR0 + CU
)
BS +BM = B, BS , BM > 0.
(90)
Using Corollary 1 we can analyze the asymptotic scenario
of N →∞ as given below.
Proposition 5: Assume that the total amount of bandwidth
of N SPs is fixed to be B and each SP i gets the same
proportion Bi = BN . If we have
BUλU > B
κNfλ
1
α
S
Nm
, (91)
then there exists an N∗(BUλU ) such that for all N >
N∗(BUλU ) we have an MNE so that Bi,M = B/N and
Bi,S = 0 for all i ∈ N . Otherwise we always have an MSNE,
with limN→∞(NBi,M , NBi,S) = (BM , BS) for all i with
BS =
B − BUλUNm
κNfλ
1
α
S
1 + λSNm
λ
1
α
S Nf
, BM =
(
B +BU
λU
κλS
)
λSNm
λ
1
α
S Nf
1 + λSNm
λ
1
α
S Nf
. (92)
Furthermore,
KS =
κBSλSNf
κBSλS +BUλU
,KU =
BUλUNf
κBSλS +BUλU
,
KM = Nm, RS =
R0(κBSλS +BUλU )
κNf
,
RM =
BMR0
Nm
, RU =
R0(κBSλS +BUλU )
Nf
.
(93)
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
The equilibrium equations for MSNE in scenarios with and
without unlicensed spectrum are given below:
With : λS
[
Nu
′
(RS) +
λSBSR0
Nf
u
′′
(RS)
]
=
Nu
′
(RM ) +RMu
′′
(RM ) (94)
Without : λS
[
Nu
′
(RS) +RSu
′′
(RS)
]
=
Nu
′
(RM ) +RMu
′′
(RM ) (95)
We only need to compare the LHS for two scenarios:
A1 =N
( κNf
CU + κλSBSR0
)α − αλSBSR0
Nf
(96)( κNf
CU + κλSBSR0
)α+1
(97)
A2 =N
( Nf
λSBSR0
)α − α( Nf
λSBSR0
)α
(98)
Doing the calculation of A1 − A2, the resulting ratio’s
numerator Z can be simplified to:
Z =(κλSBSR0)
α(CU + κλSBSR0)− α(κλSBSR0)α+1
− (N − α)(CU + κλSBSR0)α+1 (99)
Taking the derivative with respect to CU , we have:
∂Z
∂CU
= (κλSBSR0)
α − (N − α)(1 + α)(CU + κλSBSR0)α
(100)
Evaluate the expression at CU = 0:
∂Z
∂CU
|CU=0 =(κλSBSR0)α(1− (N − α)(1 + α))
≤ (κλSBSR0)α(1− (2− α)(1 + α))
= (κλSBSR0)
α
[
(α− 1
2
)2 − 5
4
]
< 0 (101)
Therefore we can conclude that ∂Z∂CU < 0, CU ≥ 0. On
the other hand, we have Z = 0 when CU = 0. As a result,
A1 < A2 always holds.
Thus, we can conclude at MSNE, the optimal bandwidth
allocation to small-cells with unlicensed spectrum is always
less than that of without unlicensed spectrum.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF RESULTS IN SECTION VII
For ideal case, it is a simple allocation optimization and we
only need to equalize the marginal utility increase with respect
to bandwidth increase for both mobile users and fixed users.
Since both WiFi network in unlicensed spectrum and small-
cells in licensed spectrum are able to serve fixed users, the
social planner should always choose the one which can lead
to more rate to invest bandwidth. As a result, when λS > λU ,
BoptU = 0, when λS < λU , B
opt
S = 0, when λS = λU , what
matters is only the total bandwidth allocated to small-cells and
unlicensed spectrum, while the split between them is arbitrary.
When λS > λU , the optimal bandwidth allocation strategy
is given by: {
λSu
′
(
λSB
opt
S R0
Nf
) = u
′
(
BoptMR0
Nm
)
BoptS +B
opt
M = B
When λS < λU , the optimal bandwidth allocation strategy
is given by: {
λUu
′
(
λUB
opt
U R0
Nf
) = u
′
(
BoptMR0
Nm
)
BoptU +B
opt
M = B
When λS = λU = λ, the optimal bandwidth allocation
strategy is given by:{
λu
′
(
λ(BoptS +B
opt
U )R0
Nf
) = u
′
(
BoptMR0
Nm
)
BoptS +B
opt
U +B
opt
M = B
For practical scenario, when λS ≥ λU , it’s always optimal
for the social planner to allocate all bandwidth to licensed
spectrum because for α-fair utility functions, maximizing
revenue is exactly the same as maximizing social welfare for
monopoly scenario. In competitive scenario, it’s also easy to
verify for α-fair utility functions, equation (95) would also
yield the same bandwidth allocation which maximizes social
welfare.
When λS = λU = λ, another optimal allocation occurs at
the point that the social planner allocate BU = B
opt
S +B
opt
U to
unlicensed spectrum and BL = B
opt
M to licensed spectrum. We
can prove that in this case the SP(s) would only allocate the
bandwidth BL to macro-cells under certain conditions, which
therefore achieves the same social welfare as the benchmark
optimal case. To prove this, we notice that the condition for
the SP(s) to only allocate bandwidth to macro-cells is given
by equation (16):
λS
( CU
κNf
)−α ≤ (
N∑
i=1
BiR0
Nm
)−α−αBimaxR0
Nm
( N∑i=1BiR0
Nm
)−α−1
(102)
When BU = B
opt
S +B
opt
U , BL = B
opt
M , we have:
CU
Nf
= λ
1
α
BoptM R0
Nm
(103)
Therefore we have:
λS
( CU
κNf
)−α
= κα
(BoptM R0
Nm
)−α
(104)(BLR0
Nm
)−α − αBimaxR0
Nm
(BLR0
Nm
)−α−1
= (1− α
N
)
(BLR0
Nm
)−α
(105)
which means (102) holds when it satisfies the following:
κα +
α
N
≤ 1 (106)
It’s easy to verify when N ≥ 2, the above condition is
always satisfied for α ∈ (0, 1). When N = 1, it is satisfied
when α ∈ (0, 0.5] .
We can also prove that when λS < λU , one possible
way to achieve the optimal benchmark social welfare is to
allocate BU = B
opt
U to unlicensed spectrum and BL = B
opt
M to
licensed spectrum. As a result, under certain conditions, the
SP(s) would also allocate all bandwidth BL only to macro-
cells, which therefore leads to the same social welfare as in
scenario 1). By similar argument, the conditions for this to
hold is the following:
κα
λS
λU
+
α
N
≤ 1 (107)
It’s easy to verify when N ≥ 2, the above condition is
always satisfied for α ∈ (0, 1). When N = 1, it is satisfied
when α ∈ (0, α0], where α0 is the unique solution to the
following equation:
κα0
λS
λU
+ α0 = 1.
